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WASHINGTON CASE LAW

federal power commission or any other regulatory body or officer acting
under statutory authority of this state or the United States.6
Defendants first argued that their combined intrastate and interstate
activities in Washington could be regulated by the Attorney General of
the United States in enforcing the Sherman Act. The court rejected
this argument's premise that the state act was intended to apply only
to cases outside the scope of the Sherman Act, finding that "such an
interpretation would be overly restrictive, unreasonable, and would
frustrate the clear intent of the legislature."" The court therefore held
that the Attorney General of the United States was not a "regulatory... officer" within the meaning of section 17. Defendants also
contended that they were exempt from the state act because they
were presently being "regulated" by consent decrees obtained by federal authorities in an earlier suit against the motion picture industry.8
The court rejected this contention, finding that "certain surveillance
and enforcement activities undertaken . . . pursuant to consent decrees"' is not "regulation" within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act1
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Back Injuries-Absence of Unusual Strain or Exertion. The Washington Supreme Court recently refused to apply the "unusual strain"
test used in heart attack cases to back injury litigation. Claimant, a
clerk-typist, suffered a herniated intervertebral disc when she twisted
around to answer a telephone which rang as she was bending over in
the opposite direction. Claimant's employer contended that her injury
did not constitute a "sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic
nature" within the statutory definition of "injury" in the Industrial
Insurance Act. A compensation award by the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals was upheld by the trial court. On appeal, keld: Impairment of claimant's skeletal mechanism, sustained in a normal
course of employment act without any unusual strain or exertion, is an
6

WAsir.

REV. CODE

§ 19.86.170 (1961).

7 64 Wn2d at 766, 394 P.2d at 229.

8United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Action to prevent a discriminatory price fixing policy by national film distributors acting in concert with movie producers and national theatre chains culminated in that decision.
91064 Wn2d at 764, 394 P.2d at 229.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.86.170, supra note 6. Accord, State v. Texaco, Inc., 14

Wis.2d 625, 111 N.W.2d 918 (1961); State v. Allied Chen. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis2d 290,
101 N.W2d 133 (1960).
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"injury" within the scope of the Industrial Insurance Act. Boeing Co.
v. Fine, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 149, 396 P.2d 145 (1964).
Claimant's employer based its contention that Mrs. Fine's herniated
disc was not an injury, as defined in the Industrial Insurance Act,1
on the allegedly analogous situation of a heart attack suffered by a
workman engaged in a routine course of employment activity. In Windust v. Department of Lalor & Indus.,2 the court had overruled prior
cases by holding that a workman's fatal heart attack, sustained while
he was performing an ordinary phase of his job, did not constitute a
"sudden and tangible happening" within the statutory definition of
injury. Windust laid down the rule that a heart attack would be a
compensable injury only if it resulted from unusual strain or exertion.
In the principal case, the employer argued that there was no difference
between a heart attack and a herniated disc when both occurred in a
normal and routine employment activity. However this argument was
rejected by the court:
[T]he thought that a heart attack suffered during accustomed exertion is
really happenstance as to time and place is exemplified... in Windust.
Contrast this to injuries of the back. It is quite possible that a slight or
usual strain applied at an unusually difficult angle could... injure a
normal back. Thus, the unusual strain requirement of the Windust case
does not apply to injuries to mechanical structures to which the angle of
application may be vastly more important than the general level of strain.'
The refusal of the Washington court to extend the unusual strain
test of the heart cases to back injuries is in line with the general policy
of workmen's compensation acts, which allows recovery for hernias,
hemorrhages, ruptured vessels and organs, broken limbs, and other
obvious structural or mechanical failures caused by routine exertion.'
The Washington rule,' requiring unusual strain in order to find compensability for general heart conditions (e.g., thrombosis, myocarditis,
arteriosclerosis, and dilation of the heart) is not a majority position,
WAsH. REv. CoDE § 51.08.100: "Injury" means a sudden and tangible happening of

a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and such physical conditions as result therefrom.
252 Wn2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958).
365 Wash. Dec.2d at 151-52, 396 P2d at 147, citing 1 LAWYERS MEDICAL CYCLOPEDiA,
§7.6, at 345 (1953).
41 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.20 (1952).
5 See Lawson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 63 Wn2d 79, 385 P.2d 537 (1963);
Williams v. Department of Labor & Indus., 54 Wn.2d 643, 343 P2d 1028 (1959) ; Favor
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 53 Wn.2d 698, 336 P2d 382 (1959) ; Hodgkinson v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn2d 500, 326 P2d 1008 (1958) ; Kruse v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn.2d 453, 326 P.2d 58 (1958).
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although the minority view adhered to by the Washington court has a
respectable number of supporters. 6
The court's rejection of the unusual strain test in back injury cases
is doubtless sound. The "usual-unusual strain" test in heart cases is
faulty in that it assumes that "there is a quantum of exertion or exposure in any occupation which is usual or normal-an assumption
which is questionable at best and certainly difficult to apply. Any
employee... knows that he will work long hours as well as short hours,
in cold weather and hot, sometimes faster, and sometimes more slowly.
."
Both New York and New Jersey purport to apply the unusual
strain test to heart cases, but the doctrine has been emasculated, if not
eliminated, by the willingness of those states' courts to find an unusual
strain from nothing more than a difficult part of claimant's ordinary
labors.8 A recent Washington case,' in which a lumber worker who
suffered a coronary occlusion while working on the "roughest log he
had ever peeled" was allowed to present his evidence of unusual strain
to a jury, may indicate that Washington is embarking on a tortuous
trail of exceptions and distinctions as to what is an "unusual" strain.
Avoidance of a similar snare of technicalities in back injury cases is
sufficient justification for the decision in the principal case.

6See, e.g., Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n, 381 P2d 253 (Colo. 1963) ; Friendly Frost
Used Appliances v. Reiser, 152 So.2d 721 (FIa. 1963); Faline v. Guido & Francis1
DeAscanus & Sons, 192 A2d 921 (Del. 1963); Latimer v. Sevier County Farmers
Cooperative, Inc., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S.W2d 673 (1961). See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra
note.4, § 38.30 and 1964 Supp. Michigan has joined the majority of states that do not
require unusual strain. Mottonen v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 360 Mich. 659, 105 N.Wd
33 (1960). See also, Comment, Stress-CausedHeart Attacks, 14 Cizv.-MAR. L. REv.
322 (1965).
71 LARs ON, op. cit. upra note 4, § 38.63.
8ld. § 38.64(a) and 1964 Supp.
9Woods v. Department of Labor & Indus., 62 Wn.2d 389, 382 P2d 1082 (1963).

